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LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN MISSOURI.
PART I.
The rights, duties, capacities or incapacities, which determine a
given person to a given class, constitute his status or condition'; or
status may be viewed as the relation which a person as a member of
a class sustains to the state, to other persons in general, or to one or
more in particular. The status examined in this article is that of
women. In as much as all minors have the same status irrespective
of sex and are equal before the law, the word woman as used by the
writer signifies a female person who has attained her majority and
is therefore eighteen years of age or upward. Women may be
divided into two classes, single women, or fernes sole, be they spin-
sters, widows or divorcees, and femes covert, whether they live with
or apart from their husbands. Each of these classes may be subdi-
vided into domiciled residents and alien residents. As to the status
of the latter no inquiry will be undertaken.
As a general rule women possess the same rights and immuni-
ties, the same legal capacities and privileges which are enjoyed by
men. A study of a status is a study of differences rather than of
similarities and parallels; and, therefore, a clear notion of the status
of women can best be had by a consideration of their incapacities,-
that is, of the rights and privileges withheld from them by the law.
The incapacities to be considered are sex and coverture. The former
limits women's political rights; the latter, their property and parental
rights and, to some extent, their liability for torts and crimes.
1Austin's Jurisprudence, par. 973.
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The political right of paramount importance to every citizen of a
state having a representative form of government is that of voting at
public elections. Strictly, suffrage is not an inherent natural right,
but a privilege which is derived primarily from the state2 and which
may be granted or withheld by constitutional provision or legislative
enactment at the pleasure of the people or the General Assembly;3
and a denial of the privilege is not a violation of either the fourteenth
or fifteenth amendments to the federal constitution.4 The constitu-
tion of Missouri grants the right to vote at elections by the people to
male citizens only,5 and therefore the women of Missouri have no
voice at the polls in the making of the laws under which they live, or
in the selections of the officers who interpret and execute them. It
will presently appear that there are many public offices for which
women are qualified, but the right to hold office without the right of
suffrage is as barren as a legal right without a remedy. Justice to
the women demands the erasure of the word male from the above
cited section of the constitution of Missouri.
To most, if not to all, of the citizens of the state the right to hold
public office is as precious and as essential as the right of suffrage.
The state has the power to fix the qualifications for holding public
office; and if the constitution is silent the test of eligibility may be
fixed by the statute. 6 Our constitution contains a general provision
that all persons appointed or elected to any office, civil or military,
must be citizens of the United States and must have resided in the
state one year next previous to their appointment or election.7 Every
woman born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof is a citizen of the United States and of the state
wherein she resides.8 The Supreme Court of Missouri has decided
that any woman qualified by citizenship and residence may hold any
public office in this state, if duly appointed or elected thereto, unless
she be barred therefrom by express terms in the statute or constitu-
tional provision which fixes the qualifications therefor.9 Under this
decision women, even though not qualified voters, may be judges of
the Supreme Court, if they are learned in the law ;10 of the Courts of
2 Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328.3 Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63.4 State ex rel. v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636.
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, affirming 53 Mo. 58.
United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.5 Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
6 State ex rel. v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227.7 Art. VIII, Sec. 12.
SConst. of U. S., tIV Amend., Sec. 1.9 State ex rel. v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636.
1OConst., Art. VI, Sec. 6.
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Appeal;11 of probate courts,'1 2 justice of the peace courts,' 3 and
county courts. 14  A woman may be a county superintendent of
schools, 15 clerk of a circuit court, 6 sheriff or coroner,17 and a mem-
ber of the police force in cities containing five thousand inhabitants
or more.'8 The Board of Examination and Registration of Nurses
consists of five members, all of whom may be women, three of whom
must be chosen from trained nurses actually engaged as such.' 9 Two
of the six members of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 20
and three of the six members of a Board of County Visitors2' must
be women. The Board of Control of the Industrial Home for Girls
shall consist of four men and two women, and all of the officials
and help for the internal management shall be women, unless the
Board order otherwise.22 And women shall not be disqualified from
holding the position of Deputy Probation Officer in the Juvenile
Court.23 In deciding that a woman is not disqualified on account of
her sex from being a county clerk, Barclay, J., said: "Women in
Missouri have been licensed as attorneys at law by the Supreme
Court. They have for years been recognized as eligible to office as
notaries public. 24 A woman now (1896) holds the responsible office
of State Librarian by appointment of the Supreme Court. 2
5
For some offices women are ineligible because of their sex; for
others, because they are not qualified voters. For the first reason a
woman cannot be Governor or any other executive officer of the
state;2 or a representative or senator in the general assembly;27
or serve as a grand or petit juror.28  For the second reason a woman
cannot be a judge of a circuit court,29 or a member of a Board of
1 1Const., Art. VI. See. 13, and Amendment of 1884. Stats., See. 3843.
12There are no qualifications specially provided for these officers. In al
such cases the constitutional provision, Art. VIII, Sec. 12, governs.
13Sec. 7370. (All citations by section only are to the 1909 Missouri stat-
utes.)
14No special qualifications prescribed.
15Sec. 10, 929.
16Sec. 2661.
17Const., Art. IX, Sec. 10.
18Laws of 1915, p. 327, Sec. 1.
19Sec. 10, 186.0 Sec. 1316.
2"Sec. 1329.
"2Secs. 1544, 1547.23Secs. 4107, 4132.24Sec. 10177 expressly authorizes the appointment of women as notaries
"2-State ex rel. v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636.
26Const., Art, V, Sees. 5, 15, 19.
z 7Const., Art. IV, Sees. 4, 6.
28Sec. 7259.
29Sec. 3843.
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Common School Directors."0 An administrator or executor is not
a public officer,31 and a woman may act as such, if she be unmar-
ried.32
The capacities and incapacities for the enjoyment of the fore-
going political privileges are shared in by all women alike; but in
respect to property rights and business and family relations cover-
ture separates women into classes of unequal status. The status of
the feme sole can be briefly described. She is liable for all of her
torts and crimes and breaches of contract. She can make contracts;
carry on business, sue and be sued; acquire, possess and dispose of
all kinds of property, execute wills, and change her domicile at pleas-
ure. In short, barring the political incapacities already discussed, her
status is' co-equal with that of her brother or father.
Marriage affects the status of a woman more profoundly and
prejudicially than does her sex. This effect of marriage is attribut-
able chiefly to the common law doctrine that the legal identity of a
wife is merged in that of her husband. This doctrine has been abro-
gated by statute so largely that there are to-day but few substantial
differences between the status of a feme covert and that of her
unmarried sister. However, the status of a married woman domi-
ciled in Missouri can best be delineated by stating her common law
incapacities and pointing out the extent to which they have been
removed, modified or left unchanged by the acts of the General
Assembly and the decisions of the courts.
In the eye of the law the husband is the head of the family, and
his wife is in duty bound to live with him, so long, at least, as he
reasonably performs his duty to her. He may select his domicile and
change it at will. "Whither thou goest I will go," is the duty of his
wife, and therefore his domicile is her domicile. She cannot acquire
a separate domicile, even though she live apart from her husband.
This common laxv rule remains unchanged in Missouri.
33
At common law a married woman is liable for her antenuptial
torts, and, during coverture her husband is jointly liable with her.
4
The Married Women's Act has not modified the wife's liability for
such torts, but it has exempted from execution therefor all of the
husband's property except what he derived from her by virtue of
3 0 Sec. 10847. State ex rel. v. McSpaden, 137 Mo. 628.
3 1Stevens v. Larwill, 110 Mo. App. 140.3 2 Sec. 14.33Comerford v. Coulter, 82 Mo. App. 362.
Schuman v. Schuman, 93 Mo. App. 99.
4aLong on Dom. Rels., Sec. 201.
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their marriage. 35 So, at common law a wife is liable for her post-
nuptial torts, except those committed by her in the presence of her
husband and by his direction or coercion.30 A recent statute abro-
gates this rule, making the wife liable for all of her post nuptial
torts, and relieving her husband from all liability therefor, unless he
would be liable as a joint tortfeasor, as if the marriage relation did
not exist. 37 And a married woman is liable for torts committed by
her in the management of her property, even though the title thereto
be in a trustee.38
A married woman is punishable in any case of treason and mur-
der committed by her independently or jointly with her husband,39
and probably for robbery and those offenses which from their nature
are generally committed by women, such as keeping a bawdy house ;40
and also for all other crimes, except those committed by her in the
presence of her husband and under his coercion. The common law
as to married women's crimes still obtains in Missouri,41 but that
portion of it which relates to crimes committed by women in the pres-
ence of their husbands ought to be abolished. The command or
coercion of a parent is no defense for a child guilty of a crime, and
the command or coercion of the husband ought not to shield a guilty
wife. Justice does not demand such a defense and it is beneath the
dignity of womanhood to be allowed it. It is no longer permitted in
Minnesota.
4 2
Under the common law a married woman cannot enter into a
binding obligation either with her husband or others. Omitting the
elements of domicile and of real or presumed coercion in torts and
crimes committed in the husband's presence, incapacity to contract,
with what depends upon it, is substantially all that coverture alone
effects in differentiating the status of a married woman from that of
men and single women. 43 The reasons usually ascribed for this dis-
ability are the unity of husband and wife and the husband's right to
reduce to his possession and ownership all of his wife's earnings,
personal property, and rents and profits of her real estate, thus leav-
35Sec. 8310.36Flesh v. Lindsay, 115 Mo. 1.
Taylor v. Pullen, 152 Mo. 434.37Laws, 1915, p. 269, Sec. 1. See Boutell v. Shellaberger, 174 S. W. 384(Mo.), L. R A. 1915, D. 847, which so decides without reference to said
statute.38Merrill v. St. Louis, 83 Mo. 244.
"
9Kelley's Crim. Law of Missouri, Sec. 17.40Clark's Crim. Law, See. 40.41Miller v. State, 162 Mo. 253.
42Pen. Code of Minn., Sec. 22.
431 Bishop on Mar. Women, Sec. 706.
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ing her no subject of contract and nothing wherewith to satisfy her
obligations. Furthermore, capacity to contract was deemed unneces-
sary, for her husband was charged with her protection and support
during his life and she was allowed dower if she survived him. Such
was the law, and the supposedly sacred and incontrovertible reasons
therefor, in this state until 1889,4 4 when the General Assembly swept
the reasons into the rubbish heap of law and logic and in a large
measure destroyed the legal unity of husband and wife by empower-
ing her to contract and be contracted with as a feme sole.45 The
power thus given is broad in scope and is not confined to any par-
ticular class of contracts or to any species of property.46 Under this
power a married woman may contract as freely with her husband as
with any one else,47 and join with him in contracts with others.4" She
may make and indorse negotiable paper and sign as a surety, even for
her husband, 49 give a recognizance for the appearance of herself as a
witness,5 appoint agents,51 and ratify their unauthorized acts .
2
Unrestricted power to contract would seem to imply the power to
carry on business; but the married woman's right in this particular
has not been left to implication, for she is expressly empowered by
statute to carry on and transact business on her own account as a
feme sole. 53  Although under a statute which enables a married
woman to contract and carry on business on her own account she
may enter into a business partnership with another woman's hus-
band, the decided weight of authority appears to be that she cannot
do so with her own, unless the statute authorize it in express terms.5
4
The reasons advanced for such an interpretation of the statute are
applicable to other contracts between husband and wife, and the
decisions show how difficult it is for the courts to yield to the pro-
44Bragg v. Israel, 86 Mo. App. 338.
O'Reilly v. Kluender, 193 Mo. 576.45Sec. 8304.46Brown v. Dressier, 125 Mo. 589.
Huss v. Culver, 70 Mo. App. 514.47Rice, Stix & Co. v. Sally, 176 Mo. 107.
O'Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588.4SNiemeyer v. Niemeyer, 70 Mo. App. 609.49Granby v. Campbell, 78 Mo. App. 502.
Grimes v. Reynolds, 184 Mo. 679.
White v. Smith, 174 Mo. 186.
5OSec. 5037.51Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668.
Carthage Marble Co. v. Bauman, 44 Mo. App. 386.52Kirkpatrick v. Pease, 202 Mo. 471, 490.
Matthews v. French, 194 Mo. 553.
53Sec. 8304.54Gilkerson-Sloss Commission Co. v. Salinger, 56 Ark. 294, and note
thereon in 16 L. R. A., 526.
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gressive spirit of the times. Whether our Supreme Court will follow
the majority or minority line of decisions when the question comes
before it is at least problematical, in view of its unqualified holding
that a married woman may contract as freely with her husband as
with any one else.5 A wife may employ her husband as her agent,50
clerk or manager of her business,57 and may be his preferred cred-
itor.5 A married woman may have a general deposit account in a
bank and her deposits therein must be held for her exclusive benefit,
free from the control or liens of all persons whomsoever, except her
own creditors. 59
The husband's common law right to his wife's earnings and the
property purchased therewith has been abolished in Missouri. Our
statute invests her with the full ownership and control of her earn-
ings outside of her domestic labor for the family, and protects them
from execution for her husband's debts.6 If her husband has
absconded, or is insane, she is also entitled to the earnings of her
minor children.01 And when engaged in any other than domestic
labor for the family she may recover damages for a diminution of
earning power caused by the defendant's wrongful act.
0 2
At common law a married woman has no standing in a court of
justice as a litigant unless her husband is joined with her as a party
plaintiff or defendant. Under our Married Women's Act she may
sue and be sued as a fene sole, enforce and have enforced against
her property such judgments as may be rendered for or against her,
and the joinder of her husband as a party is permissible but not nec-
essary.6 A husband may sue his wife as a feme sole either in a
court of law or equity, 64 and she may institute an action against him
in a court of law ;" or in equity for maintenance, 0 for the enjoyment
and protection of her separate estate,67 and for the establishment of
a resulting trust in lands purchased in his name with her money.68
55See cases cited in note 47, suupra.
M6Christian v. Smith, 85 Mo. App. 117.
57Gruner v. Scholz, 154 Mo. 415; Bank of Tipton v. Adair, 172 Mo. 156.
58Balz v. Nelson, 171 Mo. 682; Wellman v. Kaiser Inv. Co., 262 Mo. 285.59Sec. 1153.
6OSec. 8309. Christian v. McDermott Estate, 123 Mo. App. 448.
61Sec. 8299. State to use v. Mertz, 14 Mo. App. 55; Harris v. Bohle, 19
Mo. App. 529.
62Nelson v. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. App. 659.63 Sec. 8304.
64Abramsky v. Abramsky, 261 Mo. 117.
65Rice, Stix & Co. v. Sally, 176 Mo. 107.66Sharpe v. Sharpe, 134 Mo. App. 278.
67See. 8305. Rosenberger v. Mallerson, 92 Mo. App. 27.
68Hudson v. Wright, 204 Mo. 413.
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She may maintain an action for her earnings, 69 for the alienation of
her husband's affection,70 for personal injuries to herself,71 and to
quiet title to her lands ;72 and she may release a cause of action,73 or
assign it directly to her husband.74 The right of a married woman
to bring an action does not start the running of the statute of limita-
tions until the termination of the marriage relation,7" a rule for which
there is no longer any sound reason.
A married woman's property is held by her by a title which is
either legal or equitable. Property acquired directly in her own
name is denominated her legal estate, and that in which she has the
beneficial interest, the title being in the name of another as trustee,
is known as her equitable estate. These equitable estates are of two
kinds: first, those created by terms which specifically prohibit the
husband from enjoying or controlling them; and, second, those in
which he is not so prohibited by the terms of the trust. As to the
first class, the wife's equitable rights and remedies are unaffected by
the Married Women's Act ;76 but the second class is by this Act put
on the basis of the wife's legal estate. The married woman's Stat-
utory Estate is her legal estate, and her equitable estate of the sec-
ond class, discharged of the husband's common law marital rights
thereto.
When a man takes to himself a wife the common law gives him
the right to the possession and disposal of all of her personal prop-
erty, including the use, rents and profits of her real estate. Her
personal property is, by her marriage, lost to her and her heirs for-
ever. This right of the husband has been totally swept away by a
statute which secures to the wife complete and sole ownership, con-
trol and disposition of all her personal estate, including the rents and
profits of her lands, whether acquired before or after marriage.
77
The object of the statute is to protect the wife's personal property
from the common law rights of her husband, 8 and against his debts
and wrongful acts.79 A wife can not be made personally liable for
necessaries purchased by her husband for the family, but her personal
t69Eisiminger v. Stanton, 129 Mo. App. 413.
7 0 Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo.'101; Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387; Clax.
ton v. Pool, 183 Mo. App. 13.
7INelson v. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. App. 659.
72 Gardner v. Robertson, 208 Mo. 605.
73 Blair v. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 383.
.
4 Rossier v. Wabash Ry. Co., 115 Mo. App. 515.
75 Lindell & Co. v. Lindell, 142 Mo. 61; Linck v. Vorhauer, 104 Mo. App.
368.
76Woodward v. Woodward, 148 Mo. 241.
77Sec. 8309.
7SLong v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668; Nunn v. Carroll, 83 Mo. App. 135.
79McCoy v. Hyatt, 80 Mo. 130.
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property may be seized for the payment of such debts.8 0 She may,
by a duly executed writing, transfer to her husband, subject to her
own creditors' claims, her personal property or any portion thereof
for his own use and disposal;81 but an indorsement and delivery to
her husband of negotiable paper is not such an assent in writing as
the statute contemplates.8 2 Such an indorsement merely makes her
husband an agent for the collection of the paper.83
In respect to her real estate a married woman's status is com-
mensurate with if not superior to that of her husband. She has
absolute control and management of her statutory real estate,8 4 and
it can not be subjected to the payment of her husband's debts, not
even those incurred by the purchase of necessaries for the family.85
She may make a valid contract for the sale of her land whether it be
her legal or equitable estate,8 6 and may convey a full equitable fee
held in trust for her.8 7  A wife may convey by deed directly to her
husband, ss and to others without her husband joining in her deed,89
but not to the prejudice of his right of curtesy. ° If, however, a
husband convey lands directly to his wife, the conveyance invests her
with an equitable estate only, the legal title being still in him as
trustee.91 A husband can not acquire an adverse interest in his wife's
land ;92 his possession of her land is her possession.
9 3
A conveyance of land in fee to a husband and wife creates an
estate by entirety.94 The Married Women's Act has destroyed the
unity of husband and wife with respect to property owned by the
wife, but that Act has no application to estates owned by entirety.95
The husband is entitled to the possession, rents and profits of the
estate during his life, but the wife may sue alone for possession
against everybody but her husband.96 An estate by entirety may be
POMegraw v. Woods, 93 Mo. App. 647; Latimer v. Newman, 69 Mo. App.
76; Gabril v. McMullen, 111 Mo. 119.
81Sec. 8309.82Hurt v. Cook, 151 Mo. 416; Case v. Espenschied, 169 Mo. 215; Mc-
Mahon v. Welsh, 132 Mo. App. 593.83Stone v. Bank, 81 Mo. App. 9.84Jones v. Ry. Co., 86 Mo. App. 134.
85Harned v. Shores, 75 Mo. App. 500.86CIay v. Mayer, 183 Mo. 150.87Ball v. Woolfolk, 175 Mo. 278.88Glascock v. Glascock, 217 Mo. 362.89Bank v. Hageluken, 165 Mo. 443.90Meyers v. Hansbrough, 202 Mo. 495.
91Stark v. Kirchgraber, 186 Mo. 633; Rutledge v. Rutledge, 177 Mo.
App. 469.92Kohle v. Hobson, 215 Mo. 213.
93Stark v. Zehnder, 204 Mo. 442.
94Gibson v. Zimmerman, 12 Mo. 385.95Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474.96Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513; Rwen v. Hart, 183 Mo. App. 107.
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sold by the husband's creditors for his debts, but the sale will become
void as to the wife on her husband's death, if she survive him.9 7 A
divorce gives the wife an absolute moiety in such an estate, she and
her divorced husband becoming tenants in common, and she may
bring an action for partition. 9s
The statutes provide that certain specified articles of personal
property and the family homestead shall be exempt from execution
sale for the payment of the owner's debts. An enumeration of the
personal property exemptions, and a description of the homestead
must be omitted,9 9 and also a widow's rights thereto. Unmarried
women are entitled to the same exemptions allowed to unmarried
men. Exemptions can not be claimed by both husband and wife.
In the law relating to exemptions the husband is the head of the
family, and he may claim exemptions or waive the right to do so.
In case of a several judgment against a wife, she may claim exemp-
tions out of her own property, if she be the head of the family; as
when her husband has abandoned his family; and she may have such
exemptions when the judgment is against both her and her husband
and he has not claimed exemptions. 00 And when the judgment is
against the husband only, she may claim exemptions for the family
if he has absconded from the state,1' 1 or is in the penitentiary.
10 2
Prior to 1865 a married woman could not make a will unless the
right to do so was secured to her by her marriage contract. This
incapacity has been removed, and a married woman may dispose of
her property, real and personal, by her last will and testament,
10 3
and may make a joint will with her husband. 10 4 A wife can not by will
defeat her husband's right of curtesy,10 5 or, if she died childless, his
right to one-half of her real and personal property. 0 6 The probate
of a will may be contested within two years thereafter"; but this stat-
ute of limitations does not begin to run against a married woman
until the termination of her coverture. 07 Wills of femes sole are
revoked by their marriage.'08
(To be concluded in the next issue.)
9 7Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 676.
9 8Russell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235.
99See Secs. 2179, 2180, 2183 and 6704-6715.
1OoSharp v. Stewart, 185 Mo. 518; White v. Smith, 104 Mo. App. 199;
Bank v. Redlinger, 95 Mo. App. 279.
101Griffith v. Bailey, 79 Mo. 472; Lindsey v. Dixon, 52 Mo. App. 291.
:O2 Bank v. Morkamp, 130 Mo. App. 118.
'
03Sec. 536.
'
04Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289.
105Sec. 536. Soltan v. Soltan, 93 Mo. 307; Casler v. Gray, 159 Mo. 588.
106Waters v. Herboth, 178 Mo. 166; Spurlock v. Burnett, 183 Mo. 524.
1oTSec. 557.
105 ec. 540.
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